[Carfreeliving] Peak Oil

[Walk San Francisco]

End of Suburbia is an excellent documentary on this.  On a lighter side, at 
least we won't have to worry about getting run over by automobiles.
Wes

At 03:03 AM 3/30/2005, Carfreeliving-request at livablecity.org wrote:
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>    1. Re: Car lighter.... (Jason Henderson)
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Message: 1
>Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2005 18:13:46 -0800
>From: Jason Henderson <jhenders at sbcglobal.net>
>Subject: Re: [Carfreeliving] Car lighter....
>To: Bert Hill <echill at sfhills.org>
>Cc: 'Carfreeliving' <carfreeliving at livablecity.org>
>Message-ID: <424A0B5A.5020704 at sbcglobal.net>
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>There is an essay along these lines in the recent issue of Rolling Stone.
>-jh
>
>*The Long Emergency *
>
>*    By James Howard Kunstler *
>
>*    The Rolling Stone *
>
>*    **Thursday 24 March 2005** *
>
>What's going to happen as we start running out of cheap gas to guzzle?
>
>     A few weeks ago, the price of oil ratcheted above fifty-five dollars a
>
>barrel, which is about twenty dollars a barrel more than a year ago. The
>
>next day, the oil story was buried on page six of the New York Times
>
>business section. Apparently, the price of oil is not considered
>
>significant news, even when it goes up five bucks a barrel in the span of
>
>ten days. That same day, the stock market shot up more than a hundred
>
>points because, CNN said, government data showed no signs of inflation.
>
>Note to clueless nation: Call planet Earth.
>
>     Carl Jung, one of the fathers of psychology, famously remarked that
>
>"people cannot stand too much reality." What you're about to read may
>
>challenge your assumptions about the kind of world we live in, and
>
>especially the kind of world into which events are propelling us. We are
>
>in for a rough ride through uncharted territory.
>
>     It has been very hard for Americans - lost in dark raptures of nonstop
>
>infotainment, recreational shopping and compulsive motoring - to make
>
>sense of the gathering forces that will fundamentally alter the terms of
>
>everyday life in our technological society. Even after the terrorist
>
>attacks of 9/11, America is still sleepwalking into the future. I call
>
>this coming time the Long Emergency.
>
>     Most immediately we face the end of the cheap-fossil-fuel era. It is
>
>no exaggeration to state that reliable supplies of cheap oil and natural
>
>gas underlie everything we identify as the necessities of modern life -
>
>not to mention all of its comforts and luxuries: central heating, air
>
>conditioning, cars, airplanes, electric lights, inexpensive clothing,
>
>recorded music, movies, hip-replacement surgery, national defense - you
>
>name it.
>
>     The few Americans who are even aware that there is a gathering
>
>global-energy predicament usually misunderstand the core of the argument.
>
>That argument states that we don't have to run out of oil to start having
>
>severe problems with industrial civilization and its dependent systems. We
>
>only have to slip over the all-time production peak and begin a slide down
>
>the arc of steady depletion.
>
>     The term "global oil-production peak" means that a turning point will
>
>come when the world produces the most oil it will ever produce in a given
>
>year and, after that, yearly production will inexorably decline. It is
>
>usually represented graphically in a bell curve. The peak is the top of
>
>the curve, the halfway point of the world's all-time total endowment,
>
>meaning half the world's oil will be left. That seems like a lot of oil,
>
>and it is, but there's a big catch: It's the half that is much more
>
>difficult to extract, far more costly to get, of much poorer quality and
>
>located mostly in places where the people hate us. A substantial amount of
>
>it will never be extracted.
>
>     The United States passed its own oil peak - about 11 million barrels a
>
>day - in 1970, and since then production has dropped steadily. In 2004 it
>
>ran just above 5 million barrels a day (we get a tad more from natural-gas
>
>condensates). Yet we consume roughly 20 million barrels a day now. That
>
>means we have to import about two-thirds of our oil, and the ratio will
>
>continue to worsen.
>
>     The US peak in 1970 brought on a portentous change in geoeconomic
>
>power. Within a few years, foreign producers, chiefly OPEC, were setting
>
>the price of oil, and this in turn led to the oil crises of the 1970s. In
>
>response, frantic development of non-OPEC oil, especially the North Sea
>
>fields of England and Norway, essentially saved the West's ass for about
>
>two decades. Since 1999, these fields have entered depletion. Meanwhile,
>
>worldwide discovery of new oil has steadily declined to insignificant
>
>levels in 2003 and 2004.
>
>     Some "cornucopians" claim that the Earth has something like a creamy
>
>nougat center of "abiotic" oil that will naturally replenish the great oil
>
>fields of the world. The facts speak differently. There has been no
>
>replacement whatsoever of oil already extracted from the fields of America
>
>or any other place.
>
>     Now we are faced with the global oil-production peak. The best
>
>estimates of when this will actually happen have been somewhere between
>
>now and 2010. In 2004, however, after demand from burgeoning China and
>
>India shot up, and revelations that Shell Oil wildly misstated its
>
>reserves, and Saudi Arabia proved incapable of goosing up its production
>
>despite promises to do so, the most knowledgeable experts revised their
>
>predictions and now concur that 2005 is apt to be the year of all-time
>
>global peak production.
>
>     It will change everything about how we live.
>
>     To aggravate matters, American natural-gas production is also
>
>declining, at five percent a year, despite frenetic new drilling, and with
>
>the potential of much steeper declines ahead. Because of the oil crises of
>
>the 1970s, the nuclear-plant disasters at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
>
>and the acid-rain problem, the US chose to make gas its first choice for
>
>electric-power generation. The result was that just about every power
>
>plant built after 1980 has to run on gas. Half the homes in America are
>
>heated with gas. To further complicate matters, gas isn't easy to import.
>
>Here in North America, it is distributed through a vast pipeline network.
>
>Gas imported from overseas would have to be compressed at minus-260
>
>degrees Fahrenheit in pressurized tanker ships and unloaded (re-gasified)
>
>at special terminals, of which few exist in America. Moreover, the first
>
>attempts to site new terminals have met furious opposition because they
>
>are such ripe targets for terrorism.
>
>     Some other things about the global energy predicament are poorly
>
>understood by the public and even our leaders. This is going to be a
>
>permanent energy crisis, and these energy problems will synergize with the
>
>disruptions of climate change, epidemic disease and population overshoot
>
>to produce higher orders of trouble.
>
>     We will have to accommodate ourselves to fundamentally changed
>
>conditions.
>
>     No combination of alternative fuels will allow us to run American life
>
>the way we have been used to running it, or even a substantial fraction of
>
>it. The wonders of steady technological progress achieved through the
>
>reign of cheap oil have lulled us into a kind of Jiminy Cricket syndrome,
>
>leading many Americans to believe that anything we wish for hard enough
>
>will come true. These days, even people who ought to know better are
>
>wishing ardently for a seamless transition from fossil fuels to their
>
>putative replacements.
>
>     The widely touted "hydrogen economy" is a particularly cruel hoax. We
>
>are not going to replace the US automobile and truck fleet with vehicles
>
>run on fuel cells. For one thing, the current generation of fuel cells is
>
>largely designed to run on hydrogen obtained from natural gas. The other
>
>way to get hydrogen in the quantities wished for would be electrolysis of
>
>water using power from hundreds of nuclear plants. Apart from the dim
>
>prospect of our building that many nuclear plants soon enough, there are
>
>also numerous severe problems with hydrogen's nature as an element that
>
>present forbidding obstacles to its use as a replacement for oil and gas,
>
>especially in storage and transport.
>
>     Wishful notions about rescuing our way of life with "renewables" are
>
>also unrealistic. Solar-electric systems and wind turbines face not only
>
>the enormous problem of scale but the fact that the components require
>
>substantial amounts of energy to manufacture and the probability that they
>
>can't be manufactured at all without the underlying support platform of a
>
>fossil-fuel economy. We will surely use solar and wind technology to
>
>generate some electricity for a period ahead but probably at a very local
>
>and small scale.
>
>     Virtually all "biomass" schemes for using plants to create liquid
>
>fuels cannot be scaled up to even a fraction of the level at which things
>
>are currently run. What's more, these schemes are predicated on using oil
>
>and gas "inputs" (fertilizers, weed-killers) to grow the biomass crops
>
>that would be converted into ethanol or bio-diesel fuels. This is a net
>
>energy loser - you might as well just burn the inputs and not bother with
>
>the biomass products. Proposals to distill trash and waste into oil by
>
>means of thermal depolymerization depend on the huge waste stream produced
>
>by a cheap oil and gas economy in the first place.
>
>     Coal is far less versatile than oil and gas, extant in less abundant
>
>supplies than many people assume and fraught with huge ecological
>
>drawbacks - as a contributor to greenhouse "global warming" gases and many
>
>health and toxicity issues ranging from widespread mercury poisoning to
>
>acid rain. You can make synthetic oil from coal, but the only time this
>
>was tried on a large scale was by the Nazis under wartime conditions,
>
>using impressive amounts of slave labor.
>
>     If we wish to keep the lights on in America after 2020, we may indeed
>
>have to resort to nuclear power, with all its practical problems and
>
>eco-conundrums. Under optimal conditions, it could take ten years to get a
>
>new generation of nuclear power plants into operation, and the price may
>
>be beyond our means. Uranium is also a resource in finite supply. We are
>
>no closer to the more difficult project of atomic fusion, by the way, than
>
>we were in the 1970s.
>
>     The upshot of all this is that we are entering a historical period of
>
>potentially great instability, turbulence and hardship. Obviously,
>
>geopolitical maneuvering around the world's richest energy regions has
>
>already led to war and promises more international military conflict.
>
>Since the Middle East contains two-thirds of the world's remaining oil
>
>supplies, the US has attempted desperately to stabilize the region by, in
>
>effect, opening a big police station in Iraq. The intent was not just to
>
>secure Iraq's oil but to modify and influence the behavior of neighboring
>
>states around the Persian Gulf, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. The
>
>results have been far from entirely positive, and our future prospects in
>
>that part of the world are not something we can feel altogether confident
>
>about.
>
>     And then there is the issue of China, which, in 2004, became the
>
>world's second-greatest consumer of oil, surpassing Japan. China's surging
>
>industrial growth has made it increasingly dependent on the imports we are
>
>counting on. If China wanted to, it could easily walk into some of these
>
>places - the Middle East, former Soviet republics in central Asia - and
>
>extend its hegemony by force. Is America prepared to contest for this oil
>
>in an Asian land war with the Chinese army? I doubt it. Nor can the US
>
>military occupy regions of the Eastern Hemisphere indefinitely, or hope to
>
>secure either the terrain or the oil infrastructure of one distant,
>
>unfriendly country after another. A likely scenario is that the US could
>
>exhaust and bankrupt itself trying to do this, and be forced to withdraw
>
>back into our own hemisphere, having lost access to most of the world's
>
>remaining oil in the process.
>
>     We know that our national leaders are hardly uninformed about this
>
>predicament. President George W. Bush has been briefed on the dangers of
>
>the oil-peak situation as long ago as before the 2000 election and
>
>repeatedly since then. In March, the Department of Energy released a
>
>report that officially acknowledges for the first time that peak oil is
>
>for real and states plainly that "the world has never faced a problem like
>
>this. Without massive mitigation more than a decade before the fact, the
>
>problem will be pervasive and will not be temporary."
>
>     Most of all, the Long Emergency will require us to make other
>
>arrangements for the way we live in the United States. America is in a
>
>special predicament due to a set of unfortunate choices we made as a
>
>society in the twentieth century. Perhaps the worst was to let our towns
>
>and cities rot away and to replace them with suburbia, which had the
>
>additional side effect of trashing a lot of the best farmland in America.
>
>Suburbia will come to be regarded as the greatest misallocation of
>
>resources in the history of the world. It has a tragic destiny. The
>
>psychology of previous investment suggests that we will defend our
>
>drive-in utopia long after it has become a terrible liability.
>
>     Before long, the suburbs will fail us in practical terms. We made the
>
>ongoing development of housing subdivisions, highway strips, fried-food
>
>shacks and shopping malls the basis of our economy, and when we have to
>
>stop making more of those things, the bottom will fall out.
>
>     The circumstances of the Long Emergency will require us to downscale
>
>and re-scale virtually everything we do and how we do it, from the kind of
>
>communities we physically inhabit to the way we grow our food to the way
>
>we work and trade the products of our work. Our lives will become
>
>profoundly and intensely local. Daily life will be far less about mobility
>
>and much more about staying where you are. Anything organized on the large
>
>scale, whether it is government or a corporate business enterprise such as
>
>Wal-Mart, will wither as the cheap energy props that support bigness fall
>
>away. The turbulence of the Long Emergency will produce a lot of economic
>
>losers, and many of these will be members of an angry and aggrieved former
>
>middle class.
>
>     Food production is going to be an enormous problem in the Long
>
>Emergency. As industrial agriculture fails due to a scarcity of oil- and
>
>gas-based inputs, we will certainly have to grow more of our food closer
>
>to where we live, and do it on a smaller scale. The American economy of
>
>the mid-twenty-first century may actually center on agriculture, not
>
>information, not high tech, not "services" like real estate sales or
>
>hawking cheeseburgers to tourists. Farming. This is no doubt a startling,
>
>radical idea, and it raises extremely difficult questions about the
>
>reallocation of land and the nature of work. The relentless subdividing of
>
>land in the late twentieth century has destroyed the contiguity and
>
>integrity of the rural landscape in most places. The process of
>
>readjustment is apt to be disorderly and improvisational. Food production
>
>will necessarily be much more labor-intensive than it has been for
>
>decades. We can anticipate the re-formation of a native-born American
>
>farm-laboring class. It will be composed largely of the aforementioned
>
>economic losers who had to relinquish their grip on the American dream.
>
>These masses of disentitled people may enter into quasi-feudal social
>
>relations with those who own land in exchange for food and physical
>
>security. But their sense of grievance will remain fresh, and if
>
>mistreated they may simply seize that land.
>
>     The way that commerce is currently organized in America will not
>
>survive far into the Long Emergency. Wal-Mart's "warehouse on wheels"
>
>won't be such a bargain in a non-cheap-oil economy. The national chain
>
>stores' 12,000-mile manufacturing supply lines could easily be interrupted
>
>by military contests over oil and by internal conflict in the nations that
>
>have been supplying us with ultra-cheap manufactured goods, because they,
>
>too, will be struggling with similar issues of energy famine and all the
>
>disorders that go with it.
>
>     As these things occur, America will have to make other arrangements
>
>for the manufacture, distribution and sale of ordinary goods. They will
>
>probably be made on a "cottage industry" basis rather than the factory
>
>system we once had, since the scale of available energy will be much lower
>
>- and we are not going to replay the twentieth century. Tens of thousands
>
>of the common products we enjoy today, from paints to pharmaceuticals, are
>
>made out of oil. They will become increasingly scarce or unavailable. The
>
>selling of things will have to be reorganized at the local scale. It will
>
>have to be based on moving merchandise shorter distances. It is almost
>
>certain to result in higher costs for the things we buy and far fewer
>
>choices.
>
>     The automobile will be a diminished presence in our lives, to say the
>
>least. With gasoline in short supply, not to mention tax revenue, our
>
>roads will surely suffer. The interstate highway system is more delicate
>
>than the public realizes. If the "level of service" (as traffic engineers
>
>call it) is not maintained to the highest degree, problems multiply and
>
>escalate quickly. The system does not tolerate partial failure. The
>
>interstates are either in excellent condition, or they quickly fall apart.
>
>
>
>     America today has a railroad system that the Bulgarians would be
>
>ashamed of. Neither of the two major presidential candidates in 2004
>
>mentioned railroads, but if we don't refurbish our rail system, then there
>
>may be no long-range travel or transport of goods at all a few decades
>
>from now. The commercial aviation industry, already on its knees
>
>financially, is likely to vanish. The sheer cost of maintaining gigantic
>
>airports may not justify the operation of a much-reduced air-travel fleet.
>
>Railroads are far more energy efficient than cars, trucks or airplanes,
>
>and they can be run on anything from wood to electricity. The rail-bed
>
>infrastructure is also far more economical to maintain than our highway
>
>network.
>
>     The successful regions in the twenty-first century will be the ones
>
>surrounded by viable farming hinterlands that can reconstitute locally
>
>sustainable economies on an armature of civic cohesion. Small towns and
>
>smaller cities have better prospects than the big cities, which will
>
>probably have to contract substantially. The process will be painful and
>
>tumultuous. In many American cities, such as Cleveland, Detroit and St.
>
>Louis, that process is already well advanced. Others have further to fall.
>
>New York and Chicago face extraordinary difficulties, being oversupplied
>
>with gigantic buildings out of scale with the reality of declining energy
>
>supplies. Their former agricultural hinterlands have long been paved over.
>
>They will be encysted in a surrounding fabric of necrotic suburbia that
>
>will only amplify and reinforce the cities' problems. Still, our cities
>
>occupy important sites. Some kind of urban entities will exist where they
>
>are in the future, but probably not the colossi of twentieth-century
>
>industrialism.
>
>     Some regions of the country will do better than others in the Long
>
>Emergency. The Southwest will suffer in proportion to the degree that it
>
>prospered during the cheap-oil blowout of the late twentieth century. I
>
>predict that Sunbelt states like Arizona and Nevada will become
>
>significantly depopulated, since the region will be short of water as well
>
>as gasoline and natural gas. Imagine Phoenix without cheap air
>
>conditioning.
>
>     I'm not optimistic about the Southeast, either, for different reasons.
>
>I think it will be subject to substantial levels of violence as the
>
>grievances of the formerly middle class boil over and collide with the
>
>delusions of Pentecostal Christian extremism. The latent encoded behavior
>
>of Southern culture includes an outsized notion of individualism and the
>
>belief that firearms ought to be used in the defense of it. This is a poor
>
>recipe for civic cohesion.
>
>     The Mountain States and Great Plains will face an array of problems,
>
>from poor farming potential to water shortages to population loss. The
>
>Pacific Northwest, New England and the Upper Midwest have somewhat better
>
>prospects. I regard them as less likely to fall into lawlessness, anarchy
>
>or despotism and more likely to salvage the bits and pieces of our best
>
>social traditions and keep them in operation at some level.
>
>     These are daunting and even dreadful prospects. The Long Emergency is
>
>going to be a tremendous trauma for the human race. We will not believe
>
>that this is happening to us, that 200 years of modernity can be brought
>
>to its knees by a world-wide power shortage. The survivors will have to
>
>cultivate a religion of hope - that is, a deep and comprehensive belief
>
>that humanity is worth carrying on. If there is any positive side to stark
>
>changes coming our way, it may be in the benefits of close communal
>
>relations, of having to really work intimately (and physically) with our
>
>neighbors, to be part of an enterprise that really matters and to be fully
>
>engaged in meaningful social enactments instead of being merely
>
>entertained to avoid boredom. Years from now, when we hear singing at all,
>
>we will hear ourselves, and we will sing with our whole hearts.
>
>     Adapted from The Long Emergency, 2005, by James Howard Kunstler, and
>
>reprinted with permission of the publisher, Grove/Atlantic, Inc.
>
>
>
>Bert Hill wrote:
>
> > How was it enforced in the 70's - didn't it go by license plate digit
> > or number?
> > ----------------------------------------------------
> >
> > This is where the faded memories of Baby Boomers come in...
> > License plates were one scheme in certain localities.  Most areas
> > limited fuel filling to 5 gallons at a time; people waited long hours
> > in gas lines, carpooled, didn't drive, kept jerry cans in their trunks
> > & garages, installed illegal underground tanks, and siphoned each
> > other's gas tanks.  The national freeway speed limit was set at 55
> > MPH, and all speed limits were rigidly enforced, under threat of
> > losing federal highway funds.  Nixon and Congress played with price
> > controls.  Unfortunately, the rapidity of the shortage was such a
> > shock that everyone suffered, even city dwellers, non-drivers and
> > conservationists.  There was no system of equity for the victims of
> > the secondary effects of high fuel prices, and the nation faced
> > inflation and recession at the same time.  A number of elderly and
> > poor died because they couldn't afford to heat their homes or wait in
> > line for heating fuels in the Northeast.  Wood became a valuable
> > commodity, and there was an increase in carbon monoxide (and air
> > inversion) deaths. For the next ten years, compact cars were the best
> > sellers, and Toyota & Honda became major companies in the U.S.
> >
> > We can only hope the memories of the fuel embargo are latent but
> > recoverable in the minds of enough people that we are moved more
> > towards sensible conservation, technological alternatives (sustainable
> > energy), and equity; and not repeat the actioons that led to WWII with
> > global resource imperialism in a short term effort to mollify the
> > panicked masses.
> >
> > For those who haven't read it, 'Collapse' by Jared Diamond and 'Out of
> > Gas, the End of the Age of Oil' by David Goodstein are instructive.
> >
> > Bert Hill
> >
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
> >
> > /Published on Tuesday, March 29, 2005 by Reuters
> > <http://www.reuters.com/> /
> > *Unlikely Bedfellows Lobby Against U.S. Gas-Guzzlers *
> > *by Chris Baltimore*
> >
> >
> > WASHINGTON -- A group of former national security officials on Monday
> > took up the cause of weaning U.S. drivers from their oil addiction --
> > normally the realm of environmental groups -- and asked the Bush
> > administration to spend $1 billion on lighter, more fuel-efficient
> > automobiles.
> >
> > Retail U.S. gasoline prices now averaging above $2 a gallon make U.S.
> > reliance on foreign suppliers like Venezuela and Saudi Arabia a
> > looming national security crisis, a group of 31 national security
> > officials said in a letter to President Bush.
> >
> > "This really constitutes a national security crisis in the making,"
> > said letter signer Frank Gaffney, head of the Center for Security
> > Policy, a thinktank, and a former Defense Department official under
> > former President Ronald Reagan.
> >
> > Other signers included Robert McFarlane, Reagan's national security
> > advisor, and James Woolsey, Central Intelligence Agency director under
> > President Bill Clinton.
> >
> > In an uncharacteristic move, the security experts sought input from
> > groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council, which have long
> > lobbied for more fuel-efficient cars.
> >
> > "It's strange bedfellows but this is actually the real American
> > majority," said Nicole St. Clair, a spokeswoman for the NRDC. "It's
> > common sense."
> >
> > Policymakers should address rampant oil demand from gas-guzzling
> > vehicles, and stop trying to solve the problem by opening land like
> > the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to drilling, she said.
> >
> > The letter urged the government to encourage car makers to design
> > vehicles from lighter materials to improve mileage. It also endorsed
> > the use of "plug power" -- hybrid vehicles that can run off internal
> > batteries for short trips before switching to their
> > internal-combustion engines.
> >
> > The program would cost $1 billion over five years.
> >
> > Regulations known as Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards
> > require automakers to achieve an average fuel economy of 27.5 miles
> > per gallon for all passenger cars sold, and 20.7 mpg for vans, sport
> > utility vehicles and pick-up trucks. The standards have not been
> > tightened for more than a dozen years due to opposition from Detroit.
> >
> > The average fuel economy has steadily dropped since 1988. It was 20.8
> > mpg for all 2003 model vehicles, according to the Environmental
> > Protection Agency's annual mileage report.
> >
> > McFarlane told the White House that stricter mileage standards could
> > help cut U.S. crude oil imports in half.
> >
> > The group's recommendations gave short shrift to hydrogen-powered
> > vehicles, a Bush administration priority, because they will take
> > decades to field.
> >
> > U.S. drivers should not depend on foreign suppliers like Saudi Arabia
> > for security reasons, they said. Although Saudi officials say the
> > kingdom's oilfields are protected from terror attacks, McFarlane said
> > the oil installations are "extremely vulnerable from a military point
> > of view."
> >
> > If Saudi oil facilities are damaged, "You're not talking about $100
> > (per barrel) oil. You're talking about well beyond that," McFarlane
> > said. U.S. crude oil prices peaked on March 17 at $57.60 a barrel.
> >
> >
> >
> > Cheryl Brinkman
> > McKesson Corporation
> > Sr. Product Manager
> > Generic Rx
> > 415-983-7501
> > 415-732-2699 - fax
> > cheryl.brinkman at mckesson.com <mailto:cheryl.brinkman at mckesson.com>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >Carfreeliving at livablecity.org mailing list
> >to facilitate and promote car-free living in SF
> >To unsubscribe: 
> mailto:Carfreeliving-request at livablecity.org?subject=unsubscribe
> >or, for all options, go to:
> >http://livablecity.org/mailman/listinfo/carfreeliving_livablecity.org
> >
>
>--
>Jason Henderson
>San Francisco CA
>(415)-255-8136
>jhenders at sbcglobal.net
>
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>------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
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>Carfreeliving at livablecity.org
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>
>
>End of Carfreeliving Digest, Vol 2, Issue 24
>********************************************

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