[Carfreeliving] New Orleans

[Jason Henderson]

Cheryl and all,
Please keep in mind it is a draft. I am hoping to submit it somewhere 
soon Have tried a few mainstream places (Wash Post, NYT, Chron) and got 
no response or they say they have too much on the Hurricane. Maybe it is 
too long. I am hoping to have time for revising after Thursday. Plan to 
make it over to the happy hour later. Thanks

-jh


Thoughts on rebuilding (and not rebuilding) New Orleans

How to Rebuild?

These are thoughts on approaches to rebuilding New Orleans. Only a
portion of the city, along the natural levee of the Mississippi River,
should be rebuilt. The vast majority of the city, the sprawl that
surrounds the central city, should not be rebuilt. Instead Baton
Rouge, Hammond, and Lafayette should absorb the population and human
activity that once occurred in the sprawl surrounding New Orleans.
Baton Rouge, Hammond, and Lafayette should densify and minimize the
expansion of their physical footprint. Transit oriented, New Urbanist
and Smart Growth strategies would be deployed. Approximately half a
million people would be re-located and connected to New Orleans by a
new, dignified, passenger rail system. The remaining half-million
would stay in what is today Greater New Orleans, which would rebuild
its largely intact portions into a port city with university, fishing,
shipbuilding, and tourist components.

Why limit the rebuild?

New Orleans is listing but this was not the "big one." The storm
passed the city to the east. The eye, brunt of the surge and winds
leveled Waveland and much of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. It was
somewhere between a category 3 and 4, weakening as it came ashore. New
Orleans had sustained winds of over 100 miles per hour and lots of
rain. Streets flooded, streetlamps leaned, windows broke, and shingles
came off. For a moment on Monday morning Aug 29th it looked like the
city dodged a bullet. There would be deaths, as usual, and property
damage, and fallout from the failure of society to evacuate the poor.
But it got worse than that. Much worse.

The city got hit by the infamous storm surge from the east and north.
The waters of Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain inundated the east side
of the city, as predicted, modeled, and prophesied. The levees
overtopped, the pumps lost power, and the city was submerged. The
breaches came, and the "bowl effect" came into play, as predicted,
modeled, and prophesied. The entire backswamp of East Jefferson,
Orleans, and St Bernard, covered in auto-oriented, low-density sprawl,
went under.

The storm surges, overtopped and breached levees, and complete
submergence of large swaths of Greater New Orleans were predicted,
modeled, and prophesied for decades. It was taught in grammar
schools, high schools, and universities. Local television stations and
the Times Picayune ran special reports. The usual response was that we
need to raise the levees higher and higher, build bigger, better
pumps, and spend billions to accommodate the sprawl belt surrounding
the city. Everyone knew that one day the big one would come, and many
thought this was it.

Now we are hearing the mantra of "rebuild all" with the bigger levees
and improved pumps. It is important that before the majority of New
Orleanians follow the mantra of "rebuild all" that they reflect. They
should reflect on why this disaster happened, and why "rebuilding all"
is a very bad idea.

Katrina was a category three, packing 145 mph winds and weakening as
it approached the coast. Like all storms, this was a normal storm
event. Hurricanes hit the Gulf coast almost every year, somewhere –
Texas, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana. If not a Hurricane, a weaker
tropical storm comes in. These storms are part of the reason the South
is so wet, so fertile, and a land of milk and honey.

This means that New Orleans is only listing, and is not sunk. But what
if this had been a category five, and a dead-on hit? Or even a
category three and a dead-on hit? No one would have been plucked from
rooftops by helicopters because roofs would have been ripped off in
the winds. No one would have been wading through the streets because
the entire city, both banks, would have been slammed with a 25 foot
tidal surge. There would have been few survivors to rescue. The nation
would have gasped at total destruction and economic recession rather
than a bureaucratic genocide and the reality it still had an underclass.

It is important for the people of New Orleans to reflect on this storm
and on rebuilding because while this storm was normal for the Gulf
Coast, what this storm hit was largely postwar American auto-centric
sprawl that was largely below sea-level, wrapped by extensive levees,
exposed to huge volumes of water, and sinking in the peat of the
backswamps. This development pattern, and the resource extraction
industries that supported it, created the conditions for this disaster
to occur. This was not an act of god, not a natural disaster – this
was a public policy disaster. New Orleanians need to understand this
in order to make well-informed decisions about what and how to rebuild.

That means reflecting on coastal erosion, the taming of the
Mississippi River, subsidence, and sea-level rise due to global
warming. Moreover, it means reflecting on the public policy decisions,
or lack of them, that have led to this disaster.

The public policy response to accelerated coastal erosion is a cause
of this disaster. For decades pipeline canals, shipping channels, and
oil platform access canals were built willy-nilly across the coastal
marsh of Louisiana. The oil industry was given carte blanche to
decimate the coast. Salt water intruded. Marshes died, open water
moved closer towards the city. The buffer for storm surges
disintegrated. This was public policy. It was barely debated.
Environmentalists fought it, but oil companies have a strong lobby in
Louisiana, and Americans want cheap gas. Coastal erosion is now not a
Louisiana problem. It is a national problem.

Public policy towards the Mississippi River is a cause of this
disaster. The River's 25-foot levees kept the river bounded in a
swift and fast channel. Mud was not deposited in the wetlands to
recharge them – as it had been for eons. Freshwater and silt was shot
straight into the Gulf, instead of fanning over the Delta. This was
done for shipping, refining capacity, and real estate development. It
was public policy. Talk of allowing the river to breach levees and
deposit much needed sediment, or to allow the river to change course
and flow down the Atchafalaya, were dismissed as heresy.

In 60 years, the already low floodplain around New Orleans sunk by an
average of 2 feet. The subsidence was especially problematic in the
backswamps, which are more difficult to drain even after an afternoon
thunderstorm. Yet it is the backswamps were sprawl was built in full
force, from New Orleans East to Kenner on the north side, and from
Westwego to English Turn on the West Bank. These backswamps are
geographically distinctive from the natural levees – the slither of
higher ground along both banks of the Mississippi, where, for example,
the French Quarter is located. The higher natural levee no doubt
floods, as is evident in its very existence as the result of river
floods. These natural levees are also subsiding. But they are still
higher than the back swamp. Following gravity, water flows into the
backswamp from the natural levees.

It is the backswamps of New Orleans that flooded, much of which is
characterized as sprawl. The levees built to protect this sprawl now
hold the water in, allowing it to fester and stagnate, full of the
toxic residue of sprawl – motor oil, gasoline, lawn fertilizer, and so
on. From a design perspective, the sprawl that is submerged looked
similar to sprawl in Houston or Atlanta, no different from the sprawl
in Dulles or Contra Costa, or Hoffman Estates, or Tempe. Auto
dependent, hostile to pedestrians, low density, single detached homes,
segregated land uses, segregated incomes and races, full of intrusive
billboards, massive expanses of pavement – the bland generic
sprawlscape that engulfs almost every American city.

Sprawl has been a national urban policy for at least six decades. This
is the face of sprawl in New Orleans today – a toxic cesspool.

Enough has been said about global warming by the he media. Global
warming makes New Orleans even more vulnerable to storms like Katrina.
The disaster in New Orleans should be a national wake-up call to the
dangers of ignoring global warming. The national response to this
disaster should be to implement public policies that reduce our carbon
emissions and direct us to re-orient our cities in an ecologically
sustainable and socially just manner. This means all cities, from New
York to Los Angeles, from Miami to Seattle, from Lubbock Texas to
Anchorage Alaska. With the rebuild of New Orleans, New Orleanians have
a chance to create a model for the rest of the nation. I will
therefore offer some proposals for how New Orleans, and the other
cities of South Louisiana, can become a national model of ecological
sustainability, social justice, and the production of truly good
urbanism.

What to not rebuild, what to rebuild:

Removal of sprawl around New Orleans: Much of Greater New Orleans
should not be rebuilt. I am not talking about the French Quarter or
Victorian sections and the development along the natural levees. What
should not be rebuilt is the sprawl surrounding New Orleans. This
includes New Orleans East, Metairie and Kenner. Get the sprawl out of
the backswamps. Retreat the levees. Empty all areas north of I-10 and
along the Lakefront and recreate a marshland buffer zone. Use the
non-toxic debris as fill. Establish a civil conservation corps and
hire anyone looking for work. Create a new national wildlife refuge.
Build a low levee along the existing Lakeshore to shelter the
regeneration and bioremediation of these wetlands. Build a higher
levee along the Metairie-Esplanade-Chef Ridges. This levee will
protect the "old" New Orleans. Place wind turbines along levee. Repeat
same exercise on the West Bank and in St Bernard. Preserve the intact
natural levee, scuttle the sprawl. The removal of the sprawl should be
done in a methodical and coordinated manner, and with ecological
restoration as first priority. Retreat, replenish, regenerate – and
rebuild the "old" New Orleans.

Rebuild of "old" New Orleans: Rebuild damaged parts of the city south
of the Metairie-Esplanade-Chef Ridge. Rebuild a city of 500,000 that
straddles the Mississippi natural levee from the St Charles Parish
boarder with Kenner to Chalmette on the East Bank and from Avondale to
Algiers on the West Bank. Rebuild would include the CBD, French
Quarter, Marigny, Bywater, Uptown, and Riverbend. Most of these
sections of the city are still intact. Damaged, but intact. Mid City
and parts of Uptown might be beyond repair, and might have to be
demolished and rebuilt. With rebuild, use debris to elevate certain
areas, and provide the most advanced pumping and drainage system
available. Go to Holland if needed.

The New Orleans economy would center on the port, tourism, arts,
university, seafood processing, light manufacturing, and shipbuilding.
Construction and craftwork will be very important in the decade after
this storm. The port would downsize but remain critical to the nation .

The "old" New Orleans would have a systematic bike network, bus lanes,
and expanded streetcar. Parking would be reduced city-wide, former
parking spaces converted to housing and mixed-use developments. Swaths
of pavement converted to greenspace that aid in drainage. Access to
the city would be primarily by rail, but smaller-scale highways would
also be rebuilt. Frequent 24-hour passenger rail would be established
between New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Hammond, and Lafayette . Baton
Rouge would be the primary entry to New Orleans, and Armstrong
International Airport would be directly connected to the rail system
with a station near the terminals.



Densification

Baton Rouge: Build rail station in downtown Baton Rouge along present
rail lines downtown. Create high density housing and retail-services
downtown. Downtown Baton Rouge would also be the location of regional
offices, producer services, etc. The city of Baton Rouge would
experience major densification. Baton Rouge should be reconfigured
into a compact city of 1.2 million. Densification should minimize
direct physical impact on existing neighborhoods and be concentrated
along the city's arterial roads. New Urbanist design would be
required. Height limits of 4-5 stories would be allowed along
arterials. Buildings would include 4 floors of housing and ground
floor retail. Little parking would be provided. Development along
arterials would be transit oriented. Bus rapid transit, with priority
bus lanes, signal priority, proof-of-payment and low-floor platforms
would be constructed throughout the city. The city would also build
a comprehensive network of bike lanes andd sidewalks. Areas of
densification would include: Florida Boulevard, I -10 Corridor,
Airline Highway, I-12 corridor, Scenic Highway corridor, Nicholson,
Essen Lane, BlueBonnet, Siegen Lane, College Avenue, Scenic Highway,
and similar corridors. Densification in single-detached neighborhoods
would be allowed but with reduced height limits and under new urbanist
guidelines for infill.

The physical footprint of Baton Rouge should not be expanded. Rather,
the city should absorb new population by developing all surface
parking and low density sprawl. The Baton Rouge economy would
function as a regional commercial, government, service hub.
Information, government, refining, petrochemicals, food processing,
freight distribution, and a minor port would make up the economy.
Construction will dominate the economy for many years.

North Shore: Build passenger rail from Baton Rouge to Florida,
Parallel to I-12. Focus compact development in Hammond (with
north-south rail line from New Orleans to Jackson). Distribute
100,000 along corridor as bead on a string along railway line. Economy
– services, farming, food processing, light manufacturing.

Lafayette: Lafayette would absorb some of the displaced population
from Greater New Orleans. It would do so in a similar manner as Baton
Rouge - densification, minimal expansion of physical footprint,
development focused on arterials, following new urbanist guidelines.
Transit and bicycle networks would be expanded.

The Rivers

Mississippi River: A greater portion of the Mississippi River would
be diverted into the Atchafalaya. The flow down the Mississippi
would be preserved but significantly reduced. About 60- 70% of the
total flow at Old River (in Point Coupee/ Concordia Parishes) would
flow down the Atchafalaya - eventually. The remaining 30-40% flow
would continue down the present Mississippi.

Along the Mississippi north and south of New Orleans, the levees would
be breached and spillways for spring floods constructed, aiding in
replenishment of wetlands. Elevated causeways for rail and highway
constructed.

Build new port on Atchafalaya at a suitable site to be determined
roughly near New Iberia or Franklin. Do not build one single
mega-port. Build multiple smaller ports. Connect ports by rail, with
modern intermodal facilities. Minimize truck access.

Funding

This disaster was largely caused by public policy. From oil
extraction to subdivisions in backswamps, these public policies were
promoted and reinforced by a national energy policy of oil extraction
from the Louisiana coast and Gulf of Mexico. These policies included
using Louisiana as a major refining center for domestic and imported
oil, requiring access for ships and pipelines. These policies centered
on a national urban policy of promoting and subsidizing low-density,
automobile oriented sprawl such as that built in the backswamps
surrounding New Orleans. These national policies included refusing to
cooperate globally on climate change and refusing to regulate carbon
emissions. These national policies allowed much of New Orleans' poor
to be left behind while sprawl was subsidized.

For this reason the funding for the rebuild of New Orleans, including
densification of Baton Rouge, Hammond, and Lafayette, should be
financed by a nation-wide 50-cent per gallon tax on gasoline. This 50
cent gas tax would be used for disaster relief, clean-up, remediation,
rebuild, and densification. Price caps on the cost per gallon will be
imposed, to reduce the impact of the increase on the middle class. Low
income motorists would be exempt.

Public policy was the root of this disaster. Public policy must
confront and resolve it. A 50 cent gas tax is a good place to start.

Jason Henderson, Assistant Professor, Geography, San Francisco State
University
Jhenders at sfsu.edu 
<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/katrinaNO05/post?postID=_Vr0iRXjtAhMgDZsDwW3L2UIF9GsQAuT0EtPRF_BKN00LrA8ckSMHC02pfOlFNoIbYX-rP4GevN8VQ>
(415-255-8136)

[The author is a New Orleans native]



Brinkman, Cheryl wrote:

> Hi Jason, I seem not have gotten your essay - could you re-send it to me?
>I hear very good things about it - and people wondering where you submit it
>for publication.  
>
>Thanks
>
>Cheryl
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Joel Pomerantz [mailto:doajig at earthlink.net] 
>Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 11:07 AM
>To: jhenders at sbcglobal.net; Carfreeliving at livablecity.org
>Subject: Re: [Carfreeliving] New Orleans
>
>Hi Jason,
>
>I read your essay and feel like it could be truly important to the 
>national dialog.
>
>You address many of the things that need to be faced, and do it from 
>a perspective that is especially thoughtful and qualified.
>
>I'd love to read more on things others have not been addressing in 
>public spaces, like
>
>(1) specific prescriptions for rebuild, which your piece starts outlining
>(2) politics of rebuild, i.e. the chance to create a model 
>post-car-culture city
>(3) the devastating claim you seem to be making that the pre- and 
>post-storm evacuations were modeled and planned to not include or 
>care for the poor, because nobody "wants" them.
>
>Also, I'd be interested in your opinion of this NYT opinion piece 
>saying that flood insurance market forces would have kept the N.O. 
>buffer lands clear were it not for federal policy:
>http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03tierney.html
>
>What do you plan to do with it? What about a series of shorter 
>essays, one on each of the topics--at least if they're articles for 
>the general public.
>
>As with all intense writing, there are some awkward phrasings and 
>tone issues that get in the way of your message here and there, but 
>I'm glad you posted it. Thank you! More! More!
>
>Joel
>415-505-8255
>
>  
>
>>A working passenger rail system would have gotten a lot of these 
>>people out. There are buses on the docks at the naval base (dry) as 
>>well as buses flooded in a parking lot in a low part of the city. 
>>The broader reality is that Baton Rouge (and other parts of LA) does 
>>not want them. Baton Rouge has seen gun sales skyrocket. Houston is 
>>containing them in the Astrodome. This situation is going to degrade 
>>into one of 19th century indian ieservations. The use of military 
>>bases is likely in the near future to store these people, albeit 
>>with trailers built by the likes of Halliburton. This was all 
>>predicted, modeled, and prophesied. It is a big reason many did not 
>>want to leave - not just that they could not, but where would they 
>>go? No credit cards...and so on.
>>
>>It all stems from our broader capitalistic society - which requires 
>>a reserve army of labor and a huge underclass in order for there to 
>>be a middle class and an upper class. No one should be surprised. It 
>>is okay in Aceh or Sudan, but not in 'merica.
>>
>>For a bit more on what has unfolded, I am working on an essay. It is 
>>a work in progress. I hope some of you find it interesting. I have 
>>thought at length, for almost 20 years, about the rebuild of New 
>>Orleans. This was not the big one.
>>
>>-jh
>>
>>* The Public Policy Disaster in **New Orleans***
>>
>>Jason Henderson, Assistant Professor, Geography San Francisco State
>>    
>>
>University
>  
>
>>Jhenders at sfsu.edu <mailto:Jhenders at sfsu.edu>
>>
>>(415-255-8136)
>>
>>[The author is a New Orleans native]
>>
>>    
>>
>* *
>
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>
>  
>

-- 
Jason Henderson 
San Francisco CA 
(415)-255-8136
jhenders at sbcglobal.net 

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